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Abstract
This paper investigates the e®ects of motivations on the perceived
kindness of an action within the context of strong social indirect reci-
procity. We test experimentally the hypothesis that, for a given dis-
tributional outcome, an action is perceived by a third party to be less
kind if it can be strategically motivated. The results do not support
this hypothesis: social indirect reciprocity is indeed found to be signif-
icantly stronger when strategic motivations cannot be ruled out. We
interpret these ¯ndings as an indication of the role played by team
reasoning in explaining reciprocal behavior.
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Indirect reciprocity is widely recognized in natural and social sciences, both
theoretically and empirically, as an important mechanism in the evolution
of cooperation (e.g. Axelrod, 1984, Nowak and Sigmund, 1998, Leimar and
Hammerstein, 2001).1 Indirect reciprocity is also becoming an increasingly
widespread and relevant phenomenon in economic and social interactions,
since iterated exchanges between partners tend to be replaced by one-shot
interactions between strangers, as for instance in web-based auctions and
other forms of e-commerce.2
A large number of experimental studies have investigated indirectly recip-
rocal behavior focusing on iterated interactions, where there can be a strate-
gic incentive to reciprocate (e.g. Wedekind and Milinski, 2000, Engelmann
and Fischbacher, 2003, Seinen and Schram, 2004, Bolton et al., 2005, Greiner
and Levati, 2005).3 Experiments based on repeated helping games (Nowak
and Sigmund, 1998) generally provide evidence consistent with strategic rep-
utation building: helping rates rise if agents know that their action will a®ect
their own reputation.
Relatively less evidence is available on strong indirect reciprocity, de¯ned
as the conditional behavior to respond in kind to helpful and harmful actions
by or towards a third party, when this is costly and provides neither present
nor future net bene¯ts for the reciprocator (e.g. Dufwenberg et al., 2001,
Guth et al., 2001, Stanca, 2009). Despite the fact that one-shot interac-
tions are becoming increasingly important, relative to repeated interactions,
in many spheres of human life, the mechanisms underlying strong indirect
reciprocity are still an open question and relatively little is known about its
determinants.
In this paper, we focus on the behavioral relevance for strong social indi-
rect reciprocity of the motivation driving the action an agent is responding
to.(Rabin, 1993, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). 4 This question is crucial in
intention-based reciprocity models, but it is not properly addressed by the
mere presence or absence of intentionality. We start by presenting a sim-
ple framework to model explicitly the e®ect of the nature of motivations on
reciprocity. We then formulate and test the hypothesis that, for a given dis-
tributional outcome, an action is perceived to be less kind if it is strategically
motivated (i.e., driven by the expectation of a higher future payo®) than if it
is not. As a consequence, social indirect reciprocity is expected to be stronger
1See Nowak and Sigmund (2005) for a comprehensive review.
2Two di®erent mechanisms of indirect reciprocity can be distinguished when an interac-
tion between two agents also includes a third agent, not involved in the original exchange:
social indirect reciprocity (IRS), where an action is reciprocated in kind at some cost by
a third agent; generalized indirect reciprocity (IRG), where an action is reciprocated in
kind at some cost towards a third agent.
3Such incentives are reputational in the case of social indirect reciprocity, or based on
the expectation of cooperative behavior in the case of generalized indirect reciprocity.
4See Stanca et al. (2009) for an analysis of the e®ect of the nature of ¯rst-movers'
motivations on second movers' reciprocating behavior in the case of direct reciprocity.
2when strategic motivations by the ¯rst mover can be ruled out. We interpret
this hypothesis as an interpersonal extension of motivational crowding-out,
the reduction of e®ort in activities driven by intrinsic motivation following
the introduction of an instrumental reward (Deci and Ryan, 2000).
In order to test this hypothesis, we design an experiment based on a gift-
exchange game that allows us to manipulate the beliefs of the ¯rst mover
about the strategy space of the second mover. The baseline gift-exchange
game is in two phases: in phase 1 agent A decides whether to make a gift
to agent B; in phase 2 agent C, informed of the action of A in phase 1,
decides whether to make a gift to A. We compare two treatments varying
the information sets of the players. In the ¯rst treatment, subjects are not
aware of phase 2, so that giving in phase 1 cannot be strategic. In the second
treatment, subjects are aware that there will be phase 2, so that giving in
phase 1 can be driven by the expectation of a higher payo® in phase 2. The
two treatments thus only di®er with respect to the nature of the motivation
of the ¯rst mover, whereas the distributional outcome of her action and her
willingness to give are kept constant across treatments.
The results of the experimental analysis do not support the hypothesis
of interpersonal motivational crowding out. Indeed, we ¯nd that reciprocity
is less strong when strategic motivations can be ruled out. This result holds
both for strategy pro¯les and for actual decisions. We provide an interpre-
tation of the ¯ndings based on the role played by team reasoning (Sugden,
1993): the parties to a market transaction may understand it as a joint com-
mitment to an activity whose aim is to pursue a common interest. When
focusing on results at the individual level, three groups of agents emerge
in the comparison of the two treatments: self-interested agents, intention-
based reciprocators and common interest reciprocators. We ¯nd that it is
the behavior of the last group that drives the di®erent results across the two
treatments.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a framework to
model the e®ect of the motivations of an agent on the reciprocal behavior
of another agent. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4
presents the results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of alternative
interpretations and implications of the ¯ndings.
2 The E®ect of Motivations on Reciprocity
Two main classes of models incorporate fairness as a determinant of eco-
nomic behavior (see e.g. Fehr and Gachter, 2000, Sobel, 2004, and Fehr and
Schmidt, 2006, for recent surveys). In the outcome-based approach, fairness
refers to the distribution of material payo®s (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), so that agents are not concerned about how
a given distribution has been obtained. In the intention-based reciprocity
approach, agents derive utility from rewarding kind actions and punishing
unkind actions, even if this is costly in terms of material payo®s (e.g. Rabin,
31993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004).
Within the intention-based approach, one of the key issues is what de-
termines the perceived kindness of an action. In the following, building on
Falk and Fishbacher (2006), we propose a framework to model the e®ect of
the motivations driving the actions of an agent on the reciprocal behavior
of another agent. Consider agent i, who is the second-mover in a one-shot
sequential interaction with agent j. The utility function of agent i is assumed
to depend not only on material payo®s (¼i), but also on concerns for fairness,
represented by a distribution component and a reciprocity component. The
distribution component is expressed as the product of a distributional sensi-
tivity parameter and a distribution measure. The reciprocity component is
expressed as the product of a reciprocity parameter, a kindness term and a
reciprocation term:
Ui (¼i;¼j) = ¼i + ®i±i + ½iÁi¾i (1)
The parameter ®i represents the agent's sensitivity to distributional factors.
The distribution measure (±i) measures distributional fairness.5 The reci-
procity parameter (½i) represents the agent's sensitivity to reciprocity. The
kindness term (Ái) measures how kind the agent perceives the action under-
taken by the other agent. The reciprocation term (¾i) measures the e®ect of
the reciprocal action on the other agent's utility. Depending on the relative
size of the parameters ®i and ½i, and on the speci¯cation of ±i, Ái, and ¾i,
the distributional and intention-based reciprocity components may have a
di®erent relative weight in the agent's preferences.
Focusing on the reciprocity component, the question we are considering
is what determines Á, the perceived kindness of an action. In Falk and
Fishbacher (2006), the kindness term depends on both the outcome of the
action and the underlying intention:
Ái = ¢i#i (2)
where the outcome term ¢i is de¯ned as the di®erence between the second
mover's payo® and the ¯rst mover's payo® (¼i¡¼j), and the intention factor
#i is a coe±cient between 0 and 1 that parametrizes the intentionality of the
action, with #i = 1 describing a fully intentional action and #i < 1 an action
not fully intentional.
In this paper we argue that the motivation driving an action is also rele-
vant for its perceived kindness, so that the kindness term depends not only on
the outcome of the action (¢) and the intentionality the action (#), but also
on the type of motivation driving the action one is responding to (Gouldner,
1960). Perceived kindness therefore depends not only on whether an action
5In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the utility function depends negatively on the di®erence
between the agent's payo® and the payo®s of the other agent. In Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) the utility function, strictly concave in the agent's share of total payo®s, depends
negatively on the di®erence between the agent's payo® and the average payo® of other
agents.
4produced a favorable outcome and on whether the action was intentionally
chosen, but also on the reason why the action was chosen.
The expression for the kindness term in (2) should be extended as follows:
Ái = ¢i#i¹i (3)
where ¹ is the motivation factor, a parameter between 0 and 1 that char-
acterizes the type of motivation driving an action. We assume that an action
is perceived to be less kind if it is strategically motivated (¹i < 1) than if it
is not (¹i = 1). 6
This implies that, for a given outcome (¢) and intention (#), the kindness
term Á is smaller in response to strategically motivated actions (S), than to
non-strategically motivated actions (NS):
ÁS < ÁNS (4)
or, alternatively,
ÁS = (1 ¡ ¯)ÁNS (5)
with ± > 0. As a consequence, strategic motivations of the ¯rst mover result
in weaker reciprocity of the second mover than non-strategic motivation (¯ >
0).
This hypothesis can be interpreted as an interpersonal extension of the
motivational crowding out hypothesis:7 the intrinsic motivation of a strong
reciprocator may be crowded out by the strategic motivation driving the
kind action of the ¯rst mover. Existing studies of motivational crowding-out
have generally investigated di®erences in the behavior of an agent motivated
by either intrinsic or extrinsic rewards.8 Our analysis examines whether the
extrinsic motivation driving the action of an agent may have a crowding out
e®ect on the intrinsicly motivated indirectly reciprocal behavior of another
agent.
In order to test this hypothesis, in the case of social indirect reciprocity, we
designed an experiment based on a gift-exchange game with two treatments.
In one treatment, the motivation of the ¯rst mover can only be perceived as
non-strategic, while in the other treatment it can also be perceived as driven
by the expectation of a higher future payo®.
6An action is strategically motivated if it is driven by the expectation of a higher future
payo®.
7Motivational crowding out can be de¯ned as the reduction of e®ort in activities carried
out for intrinsic motivation when an instrumental reward, typically monetary, is introduced
(e.g. Deci and Ryan, 2000).
8Frey (1997) examines the reduction of the e®ort of intrinsically motivated workers
when extrinsic rewards are introduced. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) explore the e®ects
of motivational crowding-out in an experiment on fund-raising. At the theoretical level,
Harvey (2005) explains motivational crowding out within a principal-agent model where
utility is interpreted as overall satisfaction. The role of intrinsic motivation for optimal
incentive contracts was examined by Kreps (1997) and Murdock (2002). See also the
review in Lindenberg (2001).
53 Experimental Design
The experiment is based on a symmetric version of the gift-exchange game
(e.g. Fehr et al. 1993, GÄ achter and Falk, 2002). This game has the advantage
of making it easier for the reciprocating subject to interpret the nature of
the other player's intentions, whose e®ect on reciprocity is the core of our
analysis. The design is based on two treatments in a between-subjects design:
full information (FI) and partial information (PI). We start by describing
the details of the baseline game, then present the two treatments and the
experimental procedures.
3.1 Baseline Game
Subjects interact in groups of four with the following roles: A1, A2, B1 and
B2. All subjects have the same initial endowment of 20 tokens and play the
following two-stage gift-exchange game. In stage 1, A1 (A2) must choose the
amount a1 (a2), an integer between 0 and 20, she wants to send to player B1
(B2). The amount sent is subtracted from the payo® of A1 (A2), multiplied
by 3 by the experimenter, and added to the payo® of B1 (B2). In stage 2, Bi
is informed of the amount sent by Aj in stage 1 and must choose the amount
bi, an integer between 0 and 20, she wants to send to player Aj; the amount
sent is subtracted from the payo® of Bi, multiplied by 3 by the experimenter,
and added to the payo® of Aj.
At the end of stage 1, each subject is informed of her stage payo® in
tokens. At the end of stage 2 each subject is informed of her stage payo® in
tokens and of her total payo® in tokens and in euros. At the beginning of the
game subjects are informed that no show-up fee will be paid, so that total
earnings are determined only by total payo®s, converted with the exchange
rate 2 tokens = 1 euro.
3.2 Treatments
We compare two treatment of this game, where the treatment variable is the
information set of players. In the FI-treatment, the whole game is perfectly
known to players at the beginning of the game. That is, before playing stage
1 all subjects (A and B) are informed that there will be a stage 2. In the
PI-treatment, instead, only after stage 1 has ended players (A and B) are
informed that there will be a stage 2. In this case, stage 1 is played as if it
were the whole game, and stage 2 is played as a surprise sub-game.9
While in the FI-treatment ¯rst movers are aware of the social indirect
reciprocity mechanism when making their decision, they are not aware of it
9Note that subjects are simply given instructions about stage 1, without any explicit
reference to the game ending thereafter, so that subjects are not in any way cheated by
the announcement of stage 2. On the other hand, there is no reason why, when playing
stage 1, subjects should expect stage 2 to follow. See the instructions in the appendix for
details.
6in the PI-treatment. In the FI-treatment, if player A thinks that reputation
may be important in determining the choice of player B, she can expect
net bene¯ts from giving in stage 1. The same does not apply in the PI-
treatment. Therefore, strategic incentives vary across treatments for the
¯rst mover, whereas they do not change for second movers (they are absent
in both treatments). The two treatments therefore di®er with respect to the
motivations driving A's action. In the FI-treatment giving by Ai in stage
1 can be driven by pure altruism and/or by the expectation that Bj will
reciprocate. In the PI-treatment, instead, giving cannot by driven by the
expectation of a higher payo® in stage 2.
Since all players receive the same information, in stage 2 players B are
fully aware of the motivation driving players A's actions in stage 1. Given
that in stage 2 players B have to take exactly the same action as players A
in stage 1, it is particularly simple for them to interpret the nature of A's
motivations in each of the two treatments. Note that the equality of initial
endowments is intended to minimize the relevance of distributional issues for
A's choice. As for B's choice, any distributional motivation works in exactly
the same way in the two treatments, so that di®erences in the behavior of
B's cannot be accounted for with reference to distributive concerns. As all
other conditions are kept ¯xed, any di®erences in the reciprocating behavior
of players B can be interpreted as the e®ect of the di®erences in player A's
motivation.
3.3 Hypotheses
If subjects are self-interested and rational, in both treatments second movers
should give zero tokens for any number of tokens received, since they move
at the terminal node and gift-giving is costly. In the FI-treatment, if it is
common knowledge that all subjects are purely self-interested and rational,
by backward induction in stage 1 the optimal choice of players A is to give
zero. In the PI-treatment, the optimal choice of ¯rst movers is again to
give zero, since they play as if they were at the terminal node of the game.
Therefore, assuming that rationality is common knowledge, the subgame
perfect equilibrium in both treatments is for all players to give zero.
On the other hand, if preferences are characterized by concerns for fair-
ness, determined by either distributional outcomes or intention-based reci-
procity, in both treatments the response of players Bi should depend posi-
tively on the amount sent by player Aj:
Hypothesis 1 - Reciprocity: in both treatments, the amount
sent by Bi in stage 2 should be positively related to the amount
sent by Aj in stage 1.
H0: ½FI = 0 vs H1: ½FI > 0
H0: ½PI = 0 vs H1: ½PI > 0
7where ½ is the Spearman correlation coe±cient between the amounts sent
by subjects Aj and the corresponding choices of players Bi.10
Note that if some players are motivated by concerns for fairness, and
this is common knowledge, the predictions for players A will di®er in two
treatments. In particular, players A should send more in the FI-treatment,
since they might be motivated not only by pure altruism or concern for
e±ciency, but also by the expectation that indirectly reciprocal responses
could increase their own payo®. This explains why, as explained below, the
focus of our analysis is on the responses of players B in the strategy method,
as it allows us to compare the two treatments, characterized by di®erent
motivations of ¯rst movers, while controlling for di®erences in the sending
behavior of players A. We also analyze reciprocity in the actual responses of
players B in order to provide a check of the robustness of our results.
Let us now turn to the key hypothesis to be tested. As outcomes cannot
account for di®erences in the behavior of second movers across treatments,
we consider the e®ect of di®erent senders' motivations as a possible determi-
nant of reciprocity. In particular, we expect social indirect reciprocity to be
stronger in the PI-treatment, where extrinsic motivations can be ruled out,
than in the FI-treatment.
Hypothesis 2 - E®ect of motivations on reciprocity: The
positive relationship between the amounts sent by B in stage 2
and by A in stage 1 should be stronger in the PI-treatment than
in the FI-treatment.
Ho: ½PI = ½FI vs H1: ½PI > ½FI
3.4 Procedures
In stage 2 we applied a variant of the strategy method (Selten, 1967) to
elicit subjects' preferences. This means that player Bi had to provide a
response for each feasible action of player Aj, before being informed of her
actual choice. We used the strategy method (henceforth SM) for two reasons.
First, it allowed us to compare reciprocating behavior across treatments while
keeping constant the actions of ¯rst movers, whose motivations are varied
across treatments. Second, it allowed us to study conditional behavior at the
individual level, thus making it possible to distinguish between unconditional
altruism and positive reciprocity in the strategies of B players.11
After providing a response for each feasible action of player Aj, players
Bi were informed of the actual action taken by Aj and had to choose a
response (decision method, henceforth DM). Before players B made their
10We use Spearman correlations in order to avoid restricting our analysis to linear de-
pendance. Pearson coe±cients will be also reported to allow for the comparison of the two
indicators.
11See e.g. Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Falk et al. (2008) for experimental analyses of
reciprocity based on the strategy method.
8choices with the two methods (SM and DM), all players were informed that
payo®s would be determined on the basis of one of the two methods, to be
selected randomly by publicly tossing a coin. After players B had made their
decisions in both SM and DM, the method to determine the payo®s was
selected on the basis of the outcome of the coin toss. This procedure based
on responses by players B in both strategy and decision method allowed us
to compare the consistency between the strategies of B players and their
actual responses. It also allowed us to ensure that players Aj could choose
their action in stage 1 knowing that in stage 2 players Bi would choose their
action having been informed of the actual action taken by Aj in stage 1.
We run two sessions for each treatment, with 24 subjects participating
in each session, for a total amount of 96 subjects. At the beginning of each
session, subjects were randomly assigned a computer terminal and a role
among A1, A2, B1 and B2. Instructions for the game were distributed and
read aloud (see Appendix). The experimental sessions were conducted in
the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the University of Milan Bicocca.
Participants were undergraduate students recruited by e-mail using a list of
voluntary potential candidates. Sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes.
The average payment was 13.5 euro. The experiment was run using the
experimental software Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
4 Results
Table 1 reports summary statistics by treatment and by player type. In the
FI-treatment, the average amount sent is 7.54 tokens, while the median is 10
tokens. Things are rather di®erent in the PI-treatment: mean and median
amounts sent fall to 1.79 and 0.5 tokens, respectively. The di®erences between
treatments in the amounts sent by ¯rst movers are statistically signi¯cant
using a Mann-Whitney U-test. This ¯nding suggests that in the FI-treatment
¯rst movers may be driven to give by the expected reciprocal behavior of
second movers.12
The actual decisions of B-players are in line with the ¯rst movers actions,
displaying a positive and a zero median amount sent, respectively, in the
FI and PI treatments. Once we control for A's choice, using the strategy
method, we ¯nd a positive median amount sent also in the PI-treatment.
Although this is smaller than in the FI-treatment, the di®erence is not sig-
ni¯cant at the 5% level. Figures 2 and 3 display the distributions of the
amounts sent by B players in the second stage.
Table 2 reports Spearman and Pearson correlation coe±cients between
¯rst and second mover's choices by treatment, both for strategies and ac-
tual decisions. Figure 4 displays the corresponding histograms. Positive and
12Note, however, that other studies on indirect reciprocity show that ¯rst movers give
positive amounts even in the absence of strategic incentives, as in the case of Generalized
Indirect Reciprocity, where the recipient of the ¯rst mover is asked to give to a third player
(Dufwenberg et al., 2001, Stanca, 2009). This kind of setting rules out strategic incentives
for all of the roles involved.
9signi¯cant coe±cients are found for both treatments in strategy method.
The non-signi¯cant results for the PI-treatment in DM re°ect the high con-
centration of A-players' choices around zero. Overall, we can reject the null
hypothesis of no reciprocity. A visual description of this result is provided by
Figures 5 and 6, where the mean and median amounts returned, respectively,
are plotted against the amount sent by A.
Result 1: There is signi¯cant evidence of strong social indirect
reciprocity in both FI and PI treatments.
Table 2 also provides qualitative information regarding our main hypoth-
esis. The size of the correlation coe±cients in the two treatments does not
support the hypothesis of motivational crowding out. To the contrary, the
di®erence between the treatments goes in the opposite direction, displaying
weaker reciprocity in the PI-treatment. When strategic incentives for the
¯rst mover are ruled out, the reputation e®ect is less e®ective in driving
reciprocal responses. This result, albeit purely descriptive, is at odds with
hypothesis 2.
Table 3 displays results at individual level, by ranking pairs of subjects
on the basis of correlations in each of the two treatments. The corresponding
histograms are shown in Figure 4. These ¯gures, together with the corre-
sponding test results reported in Table 4, con¯rm at individual level that
lower levels of reciprocity are displayed in the PI-treatment.
Result 2: There is no evidence of motivational crowding out
for social indirect reciprocity, both at the aggregate and at the
individual level. To the contrary, reciprocal behavior is less strong
when strategic motivations of ¯rst movers can be ruled out.
A closer look at the individual data, however, suggests that this may not
be the whole story. Both individual responses in strategy method (Figures
7 and 8) and the corresponding correlations (Table 3) show that the weaker
reciprocity observed on aggregate in the PI-treatment re°ects a polariza-
tion in individual reciprocating behavior: about a half of the subjects dis-
play close-to-zero correlations, while the other half keeps reciprocating with
close-to-one correlation coe±cients, whereas in the FI-treatment individual
correlations increase more gradually while displaying no discontinuity.
A possible interpretation of this result is based on the identi¯cation of
di®erent subject types. In both treatments, some second movers appear to
be self-interested rational decision makers. In the FI-treatment, this type
accounts for about one third of the sample.13 The rest of the players recipro-
cate to di®erent degrees. In the PI-treatment, the percentage of zero-givers
is around 50 per cent and several other players send positive amounts, but
independently of A's behavior. The rest of the group keeps reciprocating in
di®erent degrees.
13This estimate is in line with the bulk of the relevant literature [e.g. Fehr et al., 2000]
10Result 3: Relative to the FI-treatment, there is a higher share
of non-reciprocators in the PI-treatment, consisting of both zero-
givers and unconditional altruists.
We interpret this result by considering a population of heterogeneous
agents: along with some rational players, there appear to coexist a fraction
of intention-based strong reciprocators and a fraction of team reasoning re-
ciprocators. Consider the behavior of second movers. The ¯rst group will
give zero in both treatments, while the second will always reciprocate. Mo-
tivational crowding out was predicted for this group, but is not con¯rmed
by the data: they act in the same way in both treatments. The third group
is responsible for most of the change across treatments. While behaving ac-
cording to a reciprocity rule in the FI-treatment, they switch to a sending
pattern that is independent from ¯rst mover's actions in the PI-treatment.
A possible explanation of this behavior is that team reasoning is based
on a context where people share a common interest and act according to it,
conditional on others doing the same. These requirements are satis¯ed in the
FI-treatment, but not in the PI-treatment: team reasoning does not apply
to the PI-treatment because the ¯rst mover's action cannot be aimed to a
common interest. As a consequence, it would not make sense for a common
interest reciprocator to condition her own behavior on it. Therefore, this
group of agents will not reciprocate in the PI-treatment, and they will send
positive or zero amounts just as the A-players did: as pure gifts.
It should be observed that the same mechanism, based on team-reasoning,
is consistent with the pattern of A-players' behavior in stage 1. As argued by
Sugden (1993, 2000), ¯rst movers may send positive gifts in a context where
everybody receives and gives at his turn, just because it is in the group's
common interest, and thus in each subject's interest, to do so. In the PI-
treatment, along with strategic incentives, we also removed this additional
reason for positive giving. The fall in giving rates in the PI-treatment can be
accounted for not only by missing strategic incentives, but also by a missing
common interest.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper investigated the relevance of the nature of the motivations driving
sending behavior in eliciting indirect reciprocity by a third party, focusing on
the case of social indirect reciprocity. Beyond its theoretical interest, social
indirect reciprocity is the relevant model of interaction in several domains. In
particular, we consider Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a natural
application of our analysis of the e®ect of motivations on indirect reciprocity:
the investigation of whether the motivations of the sender a®ect reciprocators'
responses is of key interest for the evaluation of the e®ectiveness of CSR
policies.14
14Graa°and and van de Ven (2006) ¯nd that, in a sample of 111 Dutch ¯rms, intrinsic
motives are more important in inducing involvement of the stakeholders in CSR activities.
11Using a baseline gift-exchange game, we tested the hypothesis that, for
a given distributional outcome, an action towards an agent is perceived by
a third party to be less kind if it strategically motivated than if it is not.
The results do not support this hypothesis: reciprocity is indeed signi¯-
cantly stronger when strategic motivations of ¯rst movers cannot be ruled
out. Individual-level data suggest that di®erent types of agents are present
and that they are responding di®erently to the two treatments. Interest-
ingly, they ¯t three important theoretical models of behavior: self-interest,
intention-based reciprocity and team reasoning. Behavior consistent with
team reasoning is the most important in explaining di®erent patterns of reci-
procity in the two treatments. These ¯ndings have important implications
for our understanding of social preferences and, in particular, for theories of
reciprocity.
Common to all theories of social preferences is the idea that an individ-
ual is willing to sacri¯ce his own material interests to achieve some `other-
regarding' objective, such as equality between his own payo® and those of
others or rewarding others for kind behavior. One approach to the modelling
of social preferences is to assume inequity aversion, as in the theories pro-
posed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). The
social orientation of inequity aversion is represented as a self-sacri¯cing mo-
tivation { as the willingness to give up material payo®s to generate outcomes
in which one's own position relative to others is less unfair.
Theories of inequity aversion do not take into account the role of inten-
tions. They thus fail to recognize that, for instance, in a gift-exchange game
the second mover's motivation to send a positive amount may be a response
to the intentions that are revealed by the ¯rst mover's choice. Rabin's (1993)
theory of reciprocity provides a formal representation of mutually responsive
intentions. The idea is that individuals are motivated by kindness towards
people who are being kind to them, and by unkindness to those who are
unkind to them. Our paper pointed at motivations as possible determinants
of the perceived kindness. As in the theory of inequity aversion, these other-
oriented motivations are modelled in terms of self-sacri¯ce: to be kind to
another person is to be willing to sacri¯ce one's material payo® to bene¯t
her, and to be unkind to another person is to be willing to sacri¯ce one's
material payo® to harm her.15
An alternative interpretation of our experimental results is o®ered by
team reasoning theory (Sugden 1993; Bruni and Sugden 2008). The core
idea of team reasoning, or collective intentionality, is that the parties to a
market transaction understand it as a joint commitment to an activity whose
aim is to bene¯t them all, pursuing a common interest. Mutual trust is a
15As part of their extension of Rabin's theory to sequential-move games, Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004) propose an amendment to Rabin's de¯nition of kindness. It might
seem that what is needed is a composite model of social preferences that takes into account
inequity aversion and Rabin reciprocity and trust responsiveness (Battigalli and Dufwem-
berg 2005, Pelligra 2005). Such a theory has been proposed by Falk and Fischbacher
(2006), who describe it as `a theory of reciprocity'.
12facet of that commitment. This approach allows us to understand reciprocity
as the product of individual motivations that are positively oriented towards
others without being self-sacri¯cing.
Team reasoning provides a theory in which an individual's social ori-
entation is represented as a positive attitude towards mutually bene¯cial
practices.16 That is, each player understands his own action as a component
of a joint action that is intended by the players together. Notice that, in
this account, reciprocity involves the reciprocation of good intentions: only
in this sense, there is a parallel with intention-based reciprocity. However,
the intentions that are reciprocated are collective, not individual, and they
are directed towards mutual bene¯t, not gift-giving.
Summing up, this paper argued that theoretical models of reciprocity
should take explicitly into account the e®ect of perceived motivations on re-
ciprocating behavior. In intention-based theories, reciprocity is an attitude
of individuals who are concerned about how each is treating the other. The
key concepts are kindness and unkindness, giving and taking. In theories
based on team reasoning, instead, reciprocity is related to each individual
being willing to do his part in a collective action directed at a common ob-
jective. The reciprocation is of individual e®orts directed at a common goal.
Future research on the determinants of reciprocity will have to take a broader
perspective, allowing for both these components in agents' preferences.
16\The core idea is that, in a game which is perceived as providing opportunities for
cooperation, the players reason as if they were engaged in a problem of collective choice,
jointly choosing the pro¯le of strategies that has the best consequences for them collec-
tively... In contrast to conventional game theory, in which each player asks himself `What
should I do, given what I can expect the others to do?', the players ask themselves the
unconditional question `What should we do?" (Sugden 2009, pp. 12-13).
13Appendix: Instructions
This appendix reports the instructions distributed on paper to the subjects.
Paragraph headings indicate in brackets if the given subsection is common
to both treatments or is speci¯c to the relevant treatment.
Instructions [common to all treatments]
² Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment.
² During the experiment you are not allowed to talk or communicate in
any way with other participants. If at any time you have any questions
raise your hand and one of the assistants will come to you to answer it.
² By following the instructions carefully you can earn an amount of
money that will depend on your choices and the choices of other par-
ticipants.
² At the end of the experiment the number of tokens that you have earned
will be converted in euros at the exchange rate 2 tokens = 1 euro. The
resulting amount will be paid to you in cash.
General rules
² There are 24 subjects participating in this experiment.
² In the experiment you will interact in a group of 4 subjects.
² You will not be informed about the identity of the other subjects in
your group, nor will they be informed about yours.
How players interact [PI-treatment]
² The four subjects in your group will be randomly assigned to one of
four roles: A1, A2, B1, and B2.
² Each subject will receive an endowment of 20 tokens.
² A1 chooses how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send to B1. At the
same time, A2 chooses how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send
to B2.
² We will triple the amount sent, so that B1 and B2 will receive 3 times
the tokens sent by A1 and A2, respectively.
² Therefore:
{ A1 will obtain 20 tokens minus the tokens sent to B1;
{ A2 will obtain 20 tokens minus the tokens sent to B2;
14{ B1 will obtain 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent by A1
{ B2 will obtain 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent by A2.
How players interact [FI-treatment]
² The four subjects in your group will be randomly assigned to one of
four roles: A1, A2, B1, and B2.
² Each subject will receive an endowment of 20 tokens.
² The experiment will take place in 2 phases.
PHASE 1
² A1 chooses how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send to B1. At the
same time, A2 chooses how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send
to B2.
² We will triple the amount sent, so that B1 and B2 will receive 3 times
the tokens sent by A1 and A2, respectively.
PHASE 2
² (IRS) In phase 2 B1, informed of the amount that A2 sent to B2 in
stage 1 and will choose how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send
to A2. At the same time B2, informed of the amount that A1 sent to
B1 in stage 1, will choose how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send
to A1.
² We will triple the amounts sent, so that A2 will receive 3 times the
tokens sent by B1 and A1 will receive 3 times the tokens sent by B2.
² The experiment will end. Overall earnings for each subject will be
determined as the sum of the earnings obtained in the two phases:
{ A1: 20 tokens minus the tokens he sent to a B1 in phase 1 plus 3
times the tokens sent to him by B2 in phase 2.
{ A2: 20 tokens minus the tokens he sent to a B2 in phase 1 plus 3
times the tokens sent to him by B1 in phase 2.
{ B1: 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent to him by A1 in phase
1 minus the tokens he sent to A2 in phase 2.
{ B2: 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent to him by A2 in phase
1 minus the tokens he sent to A1 in phase 2.
Instructions ON SCREEN - phase 1 [common to both treatments]
² You are A1. You have to decide how many tokens (between 0 and 20)
to send to B1. We will triple the amount sent, so that A2 will receive
3 tokens for each token you send.
15² In phase 2 B2 will be informed of the amount that you sent to B1 in
stage 1 and will choose how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send
to you.
Instructions ON SCREEN - phase 2 [common to both treatments]
² You are B1. You have to decide how many tokens (between 0 and 20)
to send to A2. We will triple the amount sent, so that A2 will receive
3 tokens for each token you send.
² (IRS) Your choice will be made with two di®erent methods:
{ Method 1: before being informed of how many tokens A2 actually
sent to B2 in phase 1, you have to decide how many tokens to send
to A2 for each of the possible amounts that he could have sent to
B2 in phase 1 (0;1;:::;20 tokens). Since there are 21 possible cases,
you have to make 21 choices.
{ Method 2: after being informed of how many tokens A2 actually
sent to B2 in phase 1, you have to decide how many tokens you
want to send to A2.
² After you have made your choice with both methods, earnings will be
determined on the basis of one of the two methods, selected randomly.
{ If method 1 is selected, of the 21 choices that you had made, only
the one corresponding to the actual decision of A1 will be used to
determine the earnings.
{ If method 2 is selected, the single choice that you had made will
be used to determine the earnings.
The experiment will end and overall earnings for each subject will be
determined as the sum of the earnings obtained in phase 1 and in phase 2.
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19Table 1: Amount sent by treatment and signi¯cance of di®erences
Mean FI Mean PI Med FI Med PI Ustat Pval
Player A 7.54 1.79 10.00 0.50 3.85 0.00
Player B (SM) 4.57 3.38 4.29 1.71 1.55 0.12
Player B (DM) 3.63 0.96 4.00 0.00 2.32 0.02
Note: FI = Full Information treatment. PI = Partial Information treatment.
Table 2: Reciprocity within treatments
FI (SM) PI (SM) FI (DM) PI (DM)
Spearman correlation 0.49 0.27 0.56 0.20
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34
Pearson correlation 0.50 0.32 0.53 -0.07
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.74
Note: FI = Full Information treatment. PI = Partial Information treatment. Columns 1
and 2 report correlations for individual strategies, columns 3 and 4 report correlations
for individual decisions. All tests are based on 24 independent observations.
20Table 3: Individual Spearman correlations, by treatment
FI treatment (P-value) PI treatment (P-value)
Pair 1 -0.06 0.81 -0.69 0.00
Pair 2 0.00 1.00 -0.04 0.85
Pair 3 0.37 0.10 0.00 1.00
Pair 4 0.41 0.06 0.00 1.00
Pair 5 0.43 0.05 0.00 1.00
Pair 6 0.51 0.02 0.00 1.00
Pair 7 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00
Pair 8 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00
Pair 9 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00
Pair 10 0.84 0.00 0.00 1.00
Pair 11 0.87 0.00 0.00 1.00
Pair 12 0.91 0.00 0.00 1.00
Pair 13 0.93 0.00 0.46 0.04
Pair 14 0.94 0.00 0.80 0.00
Pair 15 0.97 0.00 0.91 0.00
Pair 16 0.97 0.00 0.94 0.00
Pair 17 0.97 0.00 0.96 0.00
Pair 18 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.00
Pair 19 0.98 0.00 0.99 0.00
Pair 20 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00
Pair 21 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.00
Pair 22 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Pair 23 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Pair 24 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Note: FI = Full Information treatment. PI = Partial Information treatment. The ¯gures
reported are Spearman rank correlation coe±cients, sorted by size, between the amount
received and the amount sent by B players in strategy method.
Table 4: Test for di®erences in distributions of correlations
T-stat P-val U-stat P-val KS-stat P-val
Spearman corelation 2.63 0.99 1.54 0.94 0.04 0.96
Pearson correlation 2.76 1.00 1.74 0.96 0.08 0.85
Note: the table reports results of alternative tests of the null hypothesis that average
correlation coe±cients are the same in the Full Information treatment and the Partial
Information treatment, versus the corresponding one-sided alternative.
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